Social protection to support vulnerable children and families: the potential of cash transfers to protect education, health and nutrition by Adato, M. & Bassett, L.
Social protection to support vulnerable children and families: the potential of cash transfers
to protect education, health and nutrition
M. Adato
a* and L. Bassett
b
aInternational Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Regional Network on AIDS, Food Security, and Livelihoods
(RENEWAL), 2033 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006, USA;
bIndependent consultant, Washington, DC, USA
(Received 31 December 2008; final version received 11 June 2009)
Investing in social protection in sub-Saharan Africa has taken on a new urgency as HIVand AIDS interact with
other drivers of poverty to simultaneously destabilise livelihoods systems and family and community safety nets.
Cash transfer programmes already reach millions of people in South Africa, and in other countries in southern
and East Africa plans are underway to reach tens and eventually hundreds of thousands more. Cash transfers
worldwide have demonstrated large impacts on the education, health and nutrition of children. While the
strongest evidence is from conditional cash transfer evaluations in Latin America and Asia, important results are
emerging in the newer African programmes. Cash transfers can be implemented in conjunction with other services
involving education, health, nutrition, social welfare and others, including those related to HIVand AIDS. HIV /
AIDS-affected families are diverse with respect to household structure, ability to work and access to assets,
arguing for a mix of approaches, including food assistance and income-generation programmes. However, cash
transfers appear to offer the best strategy for scaling up to a national system of social protection, by reaching
families who are the most capacity constrained, in large numbers, relatively quickly. These are important
considerations for communities hard-hit by HIVand AIDS, given the extent and nature of deprivation, the long-
term risk to human capital and the current political willingness to act.
Keywords: social protection; cash transfers; HIV; AIDS; Africa; Latin America; maternal and child health
and nutrition; education; gender
Introduction
Investing in social protection in sub-Saharan Africa
has taken on a new urgency as HIVand AIDS interact
with other drivers of poverty to simultaneously
destabilise livelihoods systems and family and com-
munity safety nets. A focus on the vulnerability of
families, and on threats to the human capital of
children with lifelong and intergenerational conse-
quences, has accelerated international, regional and
national commitments to social protection. Social
protection broadly, and cash transfers in particular,
are increasingly receiving recognition as an important
part of a comprehensive HIV/AIDS response. The
importance of cash assistance for food purchases is
underscored by emerging evidence indicating the
effects of good nutrition on slowing the progression
of AIDS, and on the effectiveness of antiretroviral
therapy, with consequences not only for people living
with HIVbut also their children, families and com-
munities. Cash transfers already reach millions of
people in southern Africa, and plans are underway in
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa to roll out
programmes reaching tens and eventually hundreds of
thousands of poor people.
1 While they do not use HIV
and AIDS as targeting criteria, these programmes are
rolling out in heavily in AIDS-affected regions, and
some are targeted using multiple vulnerability criteria
that aim to capture poor and AIDS-affected families
and individuals.
2
This article examines the potential for systems of
social protection, primarily through cash transfers, to
protect the human capital of vulnerable children and
families. It is based on a study that reviewed over
300 documents on cash transfer programmes for poor
families, and related issues, around the world. Impact
assessments of 20 cash transfer programmes  10
unconditional and 10 conditional  were reviewed,
3
based on their reporting of quantitative impacts
through a reasonably strong research design. Condi-
tional cash transfer programmes (CCTs) in Latin
America and Asia, which make cash benefits condi-
tional on household members’ participation in educa-
tion, health and nutrition services, are reviewed here
because most strong, rigorous evidence to date on
cash transfer impacts come from these programmes.
CCTsthus show us what canbe achievedthrough cash
transfers. Conditionality may potentially increase
impacts of cash transfers in AIDS-affected contexts,
*Corresponding author. m.adato@cgiar.org
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ging participation in nutrition and health counselling
andotherservices,thoughthisisyettobetested.Inthe
meantime, there are several reasons why cash transfer
programmes in East and southern Africa are thus far
unconditional (see Adato & Bassett, 2008).
Why cash transfers?
Figure 1 presents an asset-based social protection
conceptual framework.
4 The programmes in the
figure are loosely placed under the objectives with
which they are generally associated. However, each
programme can be used to achieve any of the five
objectives depending on how they are designed, and
the capacities that people have to take advantage
of them. A cash transfer programme can thus assist
vulnerable families by, for example: (1) securing basic
subsistence where family illness or death reduces
income; (2) keeping children from leaving school
because of inability to pay fees or labour needed at
home; (3) preventing the sale of animals to pay for
consumption; (4) enabling investment in small live-
stock for food and income generation; (5) increasing
women’s status and child nutrition through giving
cash benefits directly to women.
Some of the most important asset investments
enabled by cash transfers are children’s health,
nutrition and education. During pregnancy and in
the first two years of life nutritional losses take their
greatest toll, causing damage that is largely irrever-
sible. Data from over 80 countries show that poor
and malnourished children are likely to start school
later, and/or complete fewer years of schooling,
compared to wealthier and healthier children (Alder-
man, Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2003; Behrman, 2000;
Behrman et al., 2003; Glewwe, Jacoby, & King, 2001;
Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). Malnourished
children have shown reduced capacity to learn based
on data from at least 16 countries (Grantham-
McGregor et al., 2007; Martorell 1995, 1999; Pollitt,
Gorman, Engle, Rivera, & Martorell, 1995). These
human capital deficits in turn have demonstrated
long-term impacts on earnings (Behrman, 2000;
Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007; Hoddinott, Mal-
uccio, Behrman, Flores, & Martorell, 2008), complet-
ing the cycle that transmits poverty through
generations.
The dynamics between human capital losses and
poverty are likely to be intensified in the context of
AIDS. Poverty and food and nutrition security are
critical concerns because of their powerful and
mutually reinforcing relationship with HIV. In a
vicious cycle, food and nutrition insecurity increases
susceptibility to HIVexposure and infection, and
lowers resiliency to AIDS impacts, while HIV/AIDS
intensifies vulnerability to food and nutrition inse-
curity.
5 All of these processes heavily affect children,
from their own risks of infection, to the economic and
psychosocial impacts of parental and other relatives’
illness and death. Improving food security through
social protection can break this cycle.
Many forms of social protection can benefit
AIDS-affected families. Food and nutrition assistance
Figure 1. An asset-based social protection framework.
AIDS Care 61programmes are particularly important for nutritional
rehabilitation for children and for people living with
AIDS, where improved quantity and quality of food,
and specific micronutrients, are needed urgently.
However, logistics, international political economy,
and policies limiting the duration of food support,
make food assistance less appropriate as a national
system of social protection. Public works programmes
can be designed to include AIDS-affected families,
through e.g., flexible family contracts, light work
activities and care-giving activities. Livelihoods sup-
port programmes also play an important role, parti-
cularly through activities that contribute to food
production, nutritional improvement and income
generation, with attention to asset constraints. Even
microcredit programme designs have been made
sensitive to the HIV/AIDS context. However, liveli-
hoods and credit programmes require greater capa-
cities on the part of beneficiaries and programme
implementers than do cash transfers, are slower to
scale up, will have narrower reach, and are harder to
target to the most disadvantaged. All of these
approaches should be part of a menu that govern-
ments and NGOs can draw on in different contexts.
Cash transfers are highlighted here because of the
particular advantages they offer for very poor,
severely AIDS-affected families who need urgent
assistance.
The impacts of cash transfers on education, health and
nutrition
Cash transfers and education
Cash transfers have the potential to increase and
protect children’s education by covering school ex-
penses, compensating for lost income when children
are sent to school rather than work, ensuring that
children are better nourished at school, and providing
an incentive for attendance when cash is conditional.
Cash transfers can have particular advantages for girls
in the context of HIVand AIDS, as girls often care for
children and ill adults in HIV-affected households.
Recent studies have shown a positive relationship
between girls’ school enrollment and reduced sexual
activity (Baird et al., 2009; Duflo et al., 2006) and
reduced HIVrisk (Pettifor, et al., 2008).
Table 1 summarises the results on education
impacts of unconditional cash transfers in three
southern African countries. In one district in South
Africa, Case, Hosegood, and Lund (2005) found
that receipt of the Child Support Grant (CSG) was
associated with an 8.1 percentage-point increase
(pB0.05) in enrolment among six-year olds, and
1.8 points (pB0.05) for seven-year olds. The larger
impacts are probably due to the substantially lower
overall enrolment rates at age six in the study region.
Much higher impacts for boys than girls at older ages
highlight the importance of attention to gender
inequalities. Using national level data in South
Africa, Samson et al.’s (2004) model establishes that
household receipt of an Old Age Pension (OAP) or
CSG is associated with a 25% reduction
§ in the share
of children not enrolled in school. Samson et al.
also find gender differences in two datasets  in one,
receipt of an OAP by a female has a greater impact
than receipt by a male, and in another receipt of an
OAP has greater impacts on the poorest girls’
enrolment (7%, pB0.001) than on the poorest
boys’ (3%, pB0.05).
In Zambia, the pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme
(SCTS) found the largest enrolment increase for
1415-year olds (8 percentage points), as well as
56-year olds (10.4 percentage points), both statisti-
cally significant. For girls, apart from the earliest
years, enrolment was stagnant or decreased among
recipients, but increased substantially for boys. The
percentage of households not sending at least
one child to school dropped from 41.4 to 33.8%,
§6
suggesting that with a very small cash grant, parents
may only send one child  usually a boy  to school
(Ministry of Community Development and Social
Services, Government of Zambia/German Technical
Cooperation (MCDSS/GTZ), 2006). Data from the
expanded SCTS found significant impacts on school
enrolment for asset-poor households of between 6
(pB0.10) and 11.4 (pB0.05) percentage points in two
of the three districts evaluated (Tembo & Freeland,
2008). Results from Malawi’s expanded Mchinji Cash
Transfer programme show the percentage of children
newly enrolled in school more than twice as high in
intervention households (8.3%) compared to com-
parison households (3.4%; pB0.001). Drop-out rates
were also higher in the comparison group (5% vs.
2%; pB0.01) (Miller, Tsoka, & Reichert, 2008).
Other impacts from African programmes can
be inferred from education expenditures (Figure 2).
Given that poorer people normally spend a greater
proportion of income on food, it is not surprising
that a relatively small proportion of grant or overall
spending is on education; nevertheless, the data
does suggest that the grant helps parents to afford
education.
CCTs,wheretransfers are normally conditionalon
children enrolling in school and achieving around an
85% attendance rate, show strong impacts on school-
ing. Mexico’s Programa de Educacio´n, Salud y Ali-
mentacio´n (PROGRESA) had minimal impact on
primary school enrolment, which was high at baseline,
but at the secondary school level where enrolment
started out low, impacts were high: 9.3 percentage
62 M. Adato and L. Bassettpoints for girls (p0.0002) and 5.8 points for boys
(p0.005) (transfer amounts were higher for girls to
encourage their enrolment). The largest impact (14.8
percentagepoints,p0.001)wasongirls’enrolmentin
Grade7,thetransitionyearwhengirlsmostoftendrop
out (Schultz, 2001, 2004). The programme also re-
duced drop-out rates, grade repetition (Behrman,
Sengupta, & Todd, 2001) and child labour (Parker &
Skoufias, 2000), but had little impact on school
attendance, achievement and school re-entry that was
sustained (Behrman, Sengupta, & Todd, 2000, 2001).
Later analysis of impacts found a 23% (pB0.001)
increase in secondary school enrolment from 1997 to
2002inruralareas,and6.5%(pB0.05)inurbanareas,
with effectsstronger for girls than boys (Parker, 2003).
Nicaragua’s Red de Proteccio´n Social (RPS) 
with grants only for primary schooling  increased
enrolment by a net 12.8 percentage points (pB0.001).
The impacts were greatest for the extreme poor,
at 25 percentage points (pB0.01). There was no
significant difference between impacts on girls and
boys, an outcome more likely at the primary than
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Figure 2. Use of unconditional cash transfers, by type of spending and programme.
Sources: Acacia Consultants (2007); Devereux (2002); Devereux et al. (2007); Devereux, Mvula, & Solomon (2006); MCDSS/
GTZ (2006); Moller and Ferreira (2003).
Note: In the case of Zambia SCTS the ﬁgure represents the proportion of overall spending by beneﬁciaries on health. In the case
of Malawi DECT, these spending numbers refer to three months of the ﬁve-month programme period JanuaryMarch 2007.
Table 1. Impacts of unconditional cash transfers on education.
Country/programme Enrolment Attendance
South Africa CSG 8.1 percentage points** (age 6)
a
1.8 percentage points** (age 7)
a
25%
b§
South Africa OAP 2025%
b§
3%** (poorest boys)
c
7%*** (poorest girls)
c
Zambia SCTS
d§ 10.4 percentage points (ages 56)
3 percentage points (ages 718)
8 percentage points (ages 1415)
2 percentage points (ages 1618)
Malawi Mchinji Cash Transfer
e 12 percentage points enrolment rate*** 1.3 days absent in previous month***
5 percentage points newly enrolled***
3 percentage points drop-out rate***
Sources:
aCase, Hosegood, and Lund (2005), KwaZulu-Natal, Umkhanyakude District;
bSamson et al. (2004), National, Income and
Expenditure Survey (2000) and The Labour Force Survey (September 2000);
cSamson et al. (2004), National, OHS data;
dMCDSS/GTZ
(2006), Kalomo District;
eMiller, Tsoka, and Reichert (2008), Mchinji District.
*pB0.10, **pB0.05, ***pB0.01.
§p-Values not reported.
AIDS Care 63secondary level. RPS also increased school atten-
dance rates by 20 percentage points (pB0.01) on
average and 33 percentage points for the extreme
poor (pB0.01). A follow-up survey two years after
households left the programme found an enrolment
drop, but still significantly higher rates than
at baseline, suggesting some sustainable impact
(Maluccio & Flores, 2005).
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola also had some positive
impacts on school attendance, drop-out rates and
grade promotion (Cardoso & Souza, 2003; de Janvry,
Finan, & Sadoulet, 2006), and Colombia’s Familias
en Accio´n had a small impact on enrolment in
primary school, but higher secondary school enrol-
ment impacts of 5.2 percentage points in urban areas
and 10.1 points in rural areas (pB0.001) (Attanasio
& Gomez, 2004). Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo
programme increased primary school enrolment by
9.812.8 percentage points (pB0.05), and reduced
child labour by 15.4 (pB0.05) to 20.6 (pB0.001)
points (Schady & Araujo, 2006). There was no impact
on achievement (Ponce, 2006). Evaluations of CCT
programmes in Honduras (International Food Policy
Research Institute [IFPRI], 2003) and Jamaica (Levy
& Ohls, 2007) showed little impact on enrolment,
possibly because of high primary enrolment at base-
line, or increased enrolment of the control group (in
Honduras), but Honduras’ CCT did show robust
increases in attendance and reductions in drop-out
rates.
In Cambodia, the Scholarships for Girls Pro-
gramme increased secondary enrolment by 2233
(pB0.001) percentage points (Filmer & Schady,
2006). An evaluation of Bangladesh’s Reaching Out
of School Children (ROSC) programme found no
impact in areas receiving only grants to schools, but in
areas with grants to schools plus cash allowances for
students the project induced an average net increase in
primary school enrolment of 8.9 percentage points
(pB0.05) for children ages 614 (Ahmed, 2006). The
CCT programme in Turkey raised secondary school
enrolment for girls by 10.7 percentage points (pB
0.10). In rural areas the programme boosted bene-
ficiary enrolment by 16.7 percentage points (pB0.05)
overall, especially for boys (22.8 percentage points,
pB0.10) compared tonon-beneficiaries (Ahmed etal.,
2006). In some more socially conservative parts of
southeastern Turkey, however, enrolment rates
are still very low despite the CCT.
7 Gender biases
in sociocultural norms often overpowered the cash
incentive  underscoring the importance of a contex-
tual understanding ofconstraints on education, andof
undertaking other approaches alongside transfers,
responding to these constraints (Adato et al., 2007).
Cash transfers and health
Cash transfers can impact on health in several ways:
by covering costs directly associated with accessing
health care (including transportation, medical fees
and the opportunity costs of time); by increasing
quantity and quality of food consumed, and by
incentivising participation in preventative health
care and health education when cash is conditioned.
Table 2 shows impacts of unconditional cash
transfers on health in Malawi, South Africa and
Zambia. In Malawi, beneficiaries of the Mchinji Cash
Transfer programme were more likely to receive care
when sick compared to non-beneficiaries after three
months in the programme (Miller & Tsoka, 2007).
After one year in the programme, the percentage of
beneficiary children reported to have been ill in the
last month was 13 percentage points lower than non-
beneficiaries (pB0.001) (Miller et al., 2008).
In South Africa, the OAP improved the health
status of pensioners and other members of the
household where pension income was pooled (Case,
2001). Qualitative research found that cash transfers
made transportation to and fees for health services
more affordable, enabled automatic qualification for
health service fee exemptions, and strengthened social
networks (Goudge et al., 2009).
In Zambia, the self-reported incidence of illness
among beneficiaries of the SCTS fell between baseline
and the evaluation, with the largest impacts among
the elderly (a 14.2 percentage-point change), followed
by children under five and adults of productive age (a
12 percentage-point change),
§ possibly as a result of
improved nutrition and hygiene (MCDSS/GTZ,
2006). Impacts on health from other country pro-
grammes could be inferred from health expenditures
(see Figure 2), although these amounts were generally
very small. This could also suggest reduced need for
health-care services resulting from better health.
Figure 3 shows health-associated impacts of CCTs
in four countries. The Honduras PRAF evaluation
found a 1521 percentage-point increase (pB0.001) in
children’s health check-ups, a 1722 percentage-point
(pB0.001) increase in participation in growth mon-
itoring, and a 13.7 percentage-point (pB0.001) to 19.5
percentage-point increase (p0.003) in attendance in
the required protocol of antenatal care sessions
(IFPRI, 2003). Despite greater health service utilisa-
tion, PRAF had no impact on health outcomes, most
likely due to the small size of the transfer and
implementation difficulties in attempts to improve
the supply of health services (IFPRI, 2003).
The RPS programme in Nicaragua was able to
successfully improve both health service utilisation
and supply, though the evaluation did not measure
health outcomes. The percentage of beneficiary
64 M. Adato and L. Bassettchildren under three attending well-child visits
increased by 16.3 percentage points (pB0.05) after
one year, with decline in impact after two years
as attendance rose within the control group.
Participation in child growth promotion increased
by 13.1 percentage points (pB0.10) after two years.
Impacts on attendance at both health centres and
growth monitoring were larger among poorer RPS
households (Maluccio & Flores, 2005).
In Jamaica, PATH increased the average number
of preventive health-care visits for children 06b y
approximately 38% (pB0.001), although this only
represents one visit every 21 months. There was
no impact on child immunisation rates, probably
because these were high at the outset (Levy & Ohls,
2007).
Evidence from evaluations of Mexico’s PRO-
GRESA indicates that clinic visits by beneficiaries
increased twice as much (pB0.001) as visits by non-
PROGRESA families over the evaluation period
(Gertler & Boyce, 2001). Growth monitoring visits
for beneficiary children under-two increased between
5.5 and 13.5 percentage points (pB0.05), varying with
length of time in the programme (Gertler, 2000).
Additionally, prenatal visits during the first semester
of pregnancy increased by 8%
§ among PROGRESA
beneficiaries and initial visits in the second and third
trimestersofpregnancyfell,achangethatisrecognised
to improve the health of pregnant women and their
infants (Skoufias, 2005).
PROGRESA significantly lowered illness rates
among children under-five, as reported by mothers,
but only for children who received benefits for at least
12 months (Gertler & Boyce, 2001). PROGRESA
children under-five had a 12% (pB0.01) lower in-
cidence of illness than non-PROGRESA children
(Gertler, 2000). This estimate should be considered a
lower bound of the impact of PROGRESA because
mothers’definitionsofillnessmayhavechangeddueto
the health and nutrition education (a condition of the
programme) and because the increased frequency of
well-child preventive health visits may have made
mothers more likely to report illness than before.
Seventy percent of the monetary transfer, on average,
was used for increased quantity and quality of house-
hold food consumption, perhaps contributing to
improved health status for children and adults. Adult
beneficiaries experienced fewer days incapacitated by
illness, fewer days in bed due to illness and fewer days
of difficulty with daily activities (Gertler & Boyce,
2001). Mexico’s Oportunidades programme was asso-
ciated with an 11% reduction in maternal mortality
and a 2% reduction in infant mortality,
§ with
the stronger impacts in the poorer municipalities
(Herna ´ ndez, Ramı´rez, Moreno, & Laird, 2004).
Colombia’sFamiliasenAccio´nincreasedattendance
at growth monitoring and development checkups by
22.8 percentage points (pB0.05) for beneficiary chil-
dren below 24 months and by 33.2 percentage points
(pB0.05) for beneficiary children 2448 months. Diar-
rhoea incidence fell by 11 percentage points (pB0.10)
among children under-four living in rural areas. These
impacts may result from health education, focusing on
Figure 3. Impacts of conditional cash transfers on health
service usage.
Sources: Attanasio et al. (2005); Gertler (2000); Gertler and
Boyce (2001); IFPRI (2003); Maluccio and Flores (2005).
Note: The mean of the range of estimates is plotted for
Honduras. For Mexico the ﬁgure represents the impact on
growth monitoring visits 15 months after baseline. No
information on health visits separate from growth monitor-
ing is available for Colombia.
Table 2. Impacts of unconditional cash transfers on health.
Country/programme Health outcomes
Malawi Mchinji Cash Transfer
a Reduced illness in past month: 13 percentage points*** (children)
South Africa OAP
b Improved health for all household members when income is pooled
Zambia SCTS
c§ Reduced incidence of illness:
12 percentage points (children 05 and adults 1964)
14 percentage points (elderly)
Sources:
aMiller, Tsoka, and Reichert (2008);
bCase (2001);
cMCDSS/GTZ (2006).
*pB0.10, **pB0.05, ***pB0.01.
§p-Values not reported.
AIDS Care 65nutrition and hygiene, which trained mothers to better
recognisesymptomsof diarrhoea(Attanasio& Gomez,
2004; Attanasio, Gomez, Heredia, & Vera-Hernandez,
2005).
Impacts on food consumption and nutrition
The vicious circle between HIV/AIDS and food and
nutrition insecurity confers particular importance
on the impacts that cash transfers have on food
consumption and nutrition. Figure 2 illustrates the
relative shares of cash transfer spending in seven
programmes, with the highest by far on food, followed
by spending on other goods (including clothing and
shoes, blankets, transportation and other household
expenditures) with smaller amounts spent on educa-
tion, health and investments. In Free State Province,
South Africa, a small survey found that grant income
led to a higher rate of increase in food expenditures,
compared to employment income (Booysen, 2004).
Table 3 summarises impacts of several uncondi-
tional cash transfer programmes on food consump-
tion and nutrition. In most of the programmes
evaluated, transfers were associated with reported
reduced hunger and increased average meals per
day, except when the transfer size was too small, as
in Mozambique (Bazo, 1998 as cited in Low, Garrett,
& Ginja, 1999). Under Zambia’s SCTS, the number
of beneficiary households having only one meal a
day and reporting hunger pangs fell (MCDSS/GTZ,
2006). Short-duration cash transfer programmes in
Malawi increased meals consumed per day (Devereux,
Mthinda, Power, Sakala, & Suka, 2007; Devereux,
Mvula, & Solomon, 2006). In South Africa, the
presence of a pensioner lowered the probability that
an adult had skipped a meal by approximately 25%
§ if
pension income was pooled (Case, 2001) and a female
pensioner in the household had a greater impact on
child hunger than adult hunger (Samson et al., 2004).
Zambian cash transfer recipients consumed more
protein, fats, fruits and vegetables, and fewer ‘‘infer-
ior’’ foods associated with coping strategies used
during food shortages (MCDSS/GTZ, 2006) and
Malawian recipients consumed almost twice as many
food groups than comparison households, and were
more likely to eat higher quality foods, including fish,
chicken, beans and vegetables (Miller et al., 2008).
Evidence of impacts of unconditional cash trans-
fers on nutrition comes mainly from South Africa and
Malawi. The CSG was shown to increase child height,
but only if it was received early in a child’s life and
covered the majority of the first three years of life. A
child receiving the CSG before age one, and for two-
thirds of the first three years of life, has approximately
0.20 greater height-for-age (pB0.10) than a child not
receiving the CSG. There is no effect for receipt
covering less than 20% of the three-year window
(Agu ¨ ero,Carter,&Woolard,2009).Thisdemonstrates
the importance of getting the transfer to mothers soon
after the child is born, and of guaranteeing continued
receipt during the critical period for child growth and
development.
Evidence from South Africa also suggests that
cash transfers targeting the elderly can improve
children’s nutritional status, especially for girls,
particularly if transfers are received by female pen-
sioners. Pensions received by women were associated
with a 1.16 (pB0.10) increase in height-for-age for
girls, though results were not significant for boys.
There was no improvement if the pensioner was
male (Duflo, 2000, 2003). Case (2001) found a one
standard deviation increase in height-for-age (5 cms
§)
associated with a pensioner in the household, equiva-
lent to six months worth of growth for black and
coloured children age 06 (Case, 2001).
The Mchinji Cash Transfer Scheme demonstrated
an 11 percentage-point reduction (pB0.08) in the
prevalence of underweight children (weight-for-age z-
scoresB2), but no impact on mean weight (Miller,
Tsoka and Reichert, 2008). Zambia’s SCTS noted
some impact on underweight in monitoring reports,
but these figures may not be representative for large
groups of children and across seasons (MCDSS/
GTZ, 2005; Sridhar & Duffield, 2006).
CCTs can affect nutrition through income, re-
quired participation in health and nutrition services,
and nutrition education for mothers. In Mexico,
PROGRESA households consumed 7.1% (pB0.05)
more calories than control households, with the
greatest impact on calories obtained from vege-
table and animal products. Messages provided in
nutrition education sessions to women contributed to
improved eating habits among beneficiary families
(Adato, Coady, & Ruel, 2000; Hoddinott, Skoufias, &
Washburn, 2000).
In Nicaragua, RPS households consumed more
food items than control households and consumed
food with higher nutritional quality (Maluccio &
Flores, 2005). In Colombia, Familias en Accion bene-
ficiary households consumed a greater share of protein
than control households (Attanasio & Mesnard, 2006).
In Brazil, Bolsa Alimentac ¸a˜o beneficiaries experi-
enced a 9% (pB0.01) increase in dietary diversity,
equivalent to a 6% increase in per capita caloric
availability and a 12% increase in caloric availability
from healthier non-staples, especially fruits
and vegetables (Olinto, Flores, Morris, & Viega,
2003). In Honduras, an evaluation identified no
impact of PRAF on food consumption or dietary
diversity; however, a more recent analysis found that
66 M. Adato and L. BassettT
a
b
l
e
3
.
I
m
p
a
c
t
s
o
f
u
n
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
a
s
h
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
s
o
n
f
o
o
d
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
n
u
t
r
i
t
i
o
n
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
/
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
F
o
o
d
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
H
u
n
g
e
r
/
m
e
a
l
s
p
e
r
d
a
y
D
i
e
t
a
r
y
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
N
u
t
r
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
s
t
a
t
u
s
M
a
l
a
w
i
M
c
h
i
n
j
i
C
a
s
h
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
a
8
3
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
f
o
o
d
i
n
t
a
k
e
*
*
*

2
3
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
b
e
i
n
g
s
a
t
i
s
f
i
e
d
a
f
t
e
r
m
e
a
l
*
*
*

3
.
7
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
i
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
v
e
r
y
h
u
n
g
r
y
*
*

3
.
2
f
o
o
d
g
r
o
u
p
s
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
d
p
e
r
d
a
y
,
o
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
*
*
*

1
1
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
c
h
i
l
d
u
n
d
e
r
w
e
i
g
h
t
*
N
o
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
m
e
a
n
W
A
Z
M
o
z
a
m
b
i
q
u
e
G
A
P
V
U
b
N
o
i
m
p
a
c
t
N
A
N
A
N
A
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
C
S
G

1
.
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
(
a
l
l
f
o
o
d
i
t
e
m
s
)
c

1
.
2
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
(
b
a
s
i
c
f
o
o
d
i
t
e
m
s
)
*
*
*
c

0
.
2
H
A
Z
,
i
f
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
i
n
f
i
r
s
t
y
e
a
r
o
f
l
i
f
e
a
n
d
f
o
r
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
2
/
3
o
f
f
i
r
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
y
e
a
r
s
*
d
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
O
A
P

1
.
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
(
a
l
l
f
o
o
d
s
)
*
*
*
c

1
0
.
5
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
i
n
r
e
a
l
a
d
u
l
t
f
o
o
d
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
(
H
I
V
-
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
)
§
e

2
5
%
c
h
a
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
a
d
u
l
t
s
k
i
p
p
e
d
m
e
a
l
(
i
f
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
i
n
c
o
m
e
p
o
o
l
e
d
)
f

5
.
8
%
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
h
u
n
g
e
r
(
y
o
u
n
g
c
h
i
l
d
)
c

2
.
2
3
c
m
s
(
g
i
r
l
s
)

0
.
8
8
c
m
s
(
b
o
y
s
)
i
f
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
b
y
w
o
m
a
n
(
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
)
*
g

5
c
m
s
(
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
C
a
p
e
)
§
f
Z
a
m
b
i
a
S
C
T
S
§
h
N
A

6
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
e
a
t
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
e
a
l
/
d
a
y

6
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
e
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
r
e
e
m
e
a
l
s
/
d
a
y

1
2
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
h
o
u
s
e
-
h
o
l
d
s
c
o
n
s
u
m
i
n
g
v
i
t
a
m
i
n
s
7
x
/
w
e
e
k

1
1
.
6
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
c
o
n
s
u
m
i
n
g
p
r
o
t
e
i
n
7
x
/
w
e
e
k

3
0
.
4
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
s
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
c
o
n
s
u
m
i
n
g
o
i
l
1
x
/
w
e
e
k
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
o
f
u
n
d
e
r
w
e
i
g
h
t
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
:
a
M
i
l
l
e
r
,
T
s
o
k
a
,
a
n
d
R
e
i
c
h
e
r
t
(
2
0
0
8
)
;
b
L
o
w
,
G
a
r
r
e
t
t
,
a
n
d
G
i
n
j
a
(
1
9
9
9
)
;
c
S
a
m
s
o
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
;
d
A
g
u
¨
e
r
o
,
C
a
r
t
e
r
,
a
n
d
W
o
o
l
a
r
d
(
2
0
0
9
)
;
e
B
o
o
y
s
e
n
(
2
0
0
4
)
;
f
C
a
s
e
(
2
0
0
1
)
;
g
D
u
f
l
o
(
2
0
0
3
)
;
h
M
C
D
S
S
/
G
T
Z
(
2
0
0
6
)
.
*
p
B
0
.
1
0
,
*
*
p
B
0
.
0
5
,
*
*
*
p
B
0
.
0
1
.
§
p
-
V
a
l
u
e
s
n
o
t
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
.
N
o
t
e
:
T
h
e
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
u
s
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
a
r
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
a
n
d
t
h
u
s
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
h
o
u
l
d
n
o
t
b
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
b
l
e
.
AIDS Care 67Table 4. Unconditional cash transfer programme descriptions.
Country Programme Eligibility
Malawi Mchinji Cash Transfer
Programme
Ultra poor (lowest expenditure quintile, below national ultra poverty
line  one meal/day, cannot purchase essential non-food items, no
valuable assets) and labour constrained (dependency ratio 3, no
household member 1965 years able to work or 3 dependents per
household member)
Mozambique Gabinete de Apoio a` Populac ¸a ˜o
Vulnera´vel (GAPVU)
Absolute poor, household head unable to work and head is older
woman 55 or older man 60, physically handicapped 18 or
chronically sick 18, malnourished pregnant women, families with
severely malnourished pregnant women or malnourished children
South Africa Child Support Grant (CSG) ChildrenB14
South Africa Old Age Pension (OAP) Low-income men 65, women 60
Zambia Social Cash Transfer Scheme
(SCTS)
Destitute (extremely needy, difficulties surviving, e.g., insufficient food,
shelter, clothing, no assets or support) and incapacitated (no fit
household member (1964 and not ill) or one with 3 dependents per
household)
Sources: Low, Garrett, and Ginja (1999); MCDSS/GTZ (2007); Samson et al. (2004); Schubert and Huijbregts (2006).
Table 5. Conditional cash transfer programme descriptions.
Bangladesh Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC) Eligibility: Children who have not had an
opportunity to attend primary school in remote
areas/dropouts from primary Conditions: 75%
attendance; 75% performance in exams
Brazil Bolsa Alimentac ¸a˜o Eligibility: Poor families with pregnant/lactating
women and children 06 years with monthly
per capita income below specified threshold
Conditions: Minimum schedule of pre-natal and
post-natal care visits; child growth monitoring;
up-to-date vaccinations; participation in nutrition
education
Bolsa Escola Eligibility: Families with children 615 years and
per capita monthly incomes no greater than R$90
(US$43) Conditions: 85% school attendance
Cambodia Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR)
Girls Scholarship Programme
Eligibility: Girls starting Grade 7 Conditions:
school enrolment; regular school attendance (no
more than 10 days absence/year without ‘‘good
reason’’); maintaining a passing grade
Colombia Familias en Accio´n Eligibility: Extremely poor families with children
06 years not participating in other programmes
(health) and/or children 717 years enrolled in
school (education) Conditions: Growth monitoring
and development check-ups (children 07)
Ecuador Bono de Desarrollo Eligibility: Households with children 016 years in
the poorest two quintiles and poor households
with elderly and/or disabled members Conditions:
Bimonthly visits to health posts for growth and
development check-ups and immunisations
(children 05); School enrolment for children 615
years; school attendance of at least 90%
68 M. Adato and L. Bassetthouseholds where the household head had primary
school education consumed more healthier foods like
meat, fish, eggs, dairy and fruits (Wiesmann &
Hoddinott, 2007).
Figure 4 shows impacts of CCTs on nutritional
status. PROGRESA reduced both stunting and
anaemia. For children 03, stunting prevalence fell
by 7.3 percentage points (pB0.10) and height-for-age
z-scores increased by 0.16 standard deviations (not
significant). For children 05, the impact is less
(Hoddinott, 2008). An average beneficiary child
(1236 months) experienced a 1 cm/year increase in
height (a 1.2% increase), equivalent to a 2.9%
increase in lifetime earnings (Behrman & Hoddinott,
2001). Two studies found reductions in anaemia by
10.6 percentage points (p0.03) for children 1224
months (Rivera, Sotres-Alvarez, Habicht, Shamah, &
Villalpando, 2004) and 25.5% (p0.01) for children
1248 months (Gertler, 2004).
Nicaragua’s RPS brought about a 5.5 percentage-
point (pB0.10) reduction in stunting prevalence
among children age 05 and an increase in mean
height-for-age z-scores by 0.13 (not significant),
perhaps because of the large transfer size (18% of
average monthly household expenditure), and the
inclusion of multiple nutrition-related conditions
(Maluccio & Flores, 2005). However, even though
RPS provided iron supplements, the programme had
no impact on anaemia, perhaps due to inconsistent
delivery, shortages and incomplete doses. While
mothers reported receiving iron supplements, they
did not always give them to children because of the
perceived bad taste and negative gastrological effects
(Adato & Roopnaraine, 2004).
Honduras Programa de Asignacio ´ n Familiar (PRAF-II) Eligibility: Poor households with pregnant women
and/or children under three (health) with children
612 who have not yet completed the fourth grade
of primary school (education)
Conditions: Check-ups at health centre (children 0
5); Growth monitoring and promotion for mothers
with children B2; At least five pre-natal check-
ups; Attendance in at least four training courses/
year (main beneficiary)
Jamaica Programme of Advancement Through Health
and Education (PATH)
Eligibility: Poor children ages 06 (health) and
617 (or until completion of secondary school);
persons  60 years; pregnant or lactating women
up to six months after delivery; poor, disabled and
destitute adults B65; elderly  65
Conditions: Health visits (children and adults and
pregnant and lactating women); school attendance
of at least 85% (children 617)
Mexico Programa de Educacio´n, Salud y Alimentacio´n
(Progresa)/ Oportunidades
Eligibility: Poor households
Conditions: School attendance (80% monthly and
93% annually); compliance by all household
members with schedule of preventative health
check-ups; attendance at health and nutrition
lectures (family member older than 15)
Nicaragua Red de Proteccio´n Social (RPS) Eligibility: Poor households with children 05
(health); poor households with children 713 who
have not yet completed fourth grade in primary
school (education)
Conditions: Attendance at health care visits (chil-
dren 05); up-to-date vaccinations (children 05);
monthly health education workshops
Turkey Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP) Eligibility: Poorest 6% of the population with
children 06 years or in primary or secondary
school (ages 617) and pregnant mothers
Conditions: Clinic visits for health check-ups; give
birth in hospital; school attendance of at least
80%; cannot repeat same grade twice
Sources: Ahmed et al. (2007); Levy and Ohls (2007); Maluccio and Flores (2005); World Bank (2009).
Table 5 (Continued)
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AIDS Care 71Colombia’s Familias en Accio´n programme reduced
theprobabilityofstuntingby6.9percentagepoints(pB
0.05)andincreasedmeanheight-for-agez-scoresby0.16
(pB0.10) for children 024 months (Attanasio et al.,
2005). Honduras’ PRAF had no significant impact on
stuntingoranaemia,likelydue tothesmalltransfersize
(only 4% of average monthly household expenditure),
sporadic transfer distribution and insufficient supply-
side services (IFPRI, 2003; Maluccio, 2004). Under-
standing the reasons for CCT impacts on nutritional
status is difficult because, to date, CCT impact evalua-
tionshavenotyetdisentangledthedifferentialimpactof
individual programme components on observed out-
comes(researchonthistopiccouldimproveprogramme
design).
Conclusion
Social protection is increasingly recognised as an
essential part of a comprehensive response to the
impact of HIVand AIDS on children and families.
Cash transfers have demonstrated significant impacts
on the human capital of children in many countries in
Latin America and Asia, and evidence is building
of such impacts from programmes in sub-Saharan
Africa. If cash transfers succeed in increasing chil-
dren’s presence in school, their benefits may multiply
by reducing HIVrisk, and increasing children’s access
to additional services. Cash transfers can be imple-
mented in combination with other services to achieve
broader objectives, building synergies in impacts and
programme operations. In addition to promoting
school enrolment and attendance, and preventative
health-care activities, options under discussion or
underway include early childhood development,
after-school programmes, child protection and
other social welfare services, information, education
and communication activities, savings schemes, life
skills training, voluntary testing and counselling,
ART counselling and services, home-based care,
micronutrient and food supplementation and nutri-
tion counselling.
AIDS-affected families are diverse with respect to
poverty level, education, household structure, stage
of illness progression, ability to work, dependency
ratios and access to assets. This argues for a mix of
approaches rather than a single approach: food and
nutrition programmes; public works and livelihoods
support programmes are all important options for
assisting families. Cash transfers appear to offer the
best strategy for reaching families who are the very
poorest, most capacity constrained and at-risk, in
large numbers, relatively quickly, in a well-targeted
and systematic manner, compared to alternative
approaches. These are important considerations
given the extent and nature of deprivation, the
long-term risk to human capital and the current
international and national political willingness to act.
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Notes
1. Whether they achieve these goals depends on a number
of political, economic and technical factors.
2. Several lines of argument and a vast amount of evidence
point to the wisdom of targeting on poverty and
vulnerability criteria, rather than on AIDS and orphans
(see Adato & Bassett 2008).
3. See Tables 4 through 7 later in this article for descrip-
tions of the cash transfer programmes and evaluations
reviewed.
4. The categories of ‘‘protective,’’ ‘‘preventative’’ and
‘‘promotional’’ social protection come from Guhan
(1994). The category of ‘‘transformational’’ comes
from Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler (2004).
5. HIVand AIDS can lead to increased food insecurity and
malnutrition via undermining livelihoods, decreasing
food intake and absorption and increasing energy
requirements. In turn, food insecurity and malnutrition
can heighten susceptibility to HIVexposure and infec-
tion via increasing transactional sex, migration, suscept-
ibility to TB and mother-to-child transmission (For
reviews of studies of these relationships see Gillespie &
Kadiyala, 2005; Gillespie, Kadiyala, & Greener, 2007).
Figure 4. Impacts of conditional cash transfers on stunting
prevalence.
*pB0.01.
72 M. Adato and L. Bassett6. §=Signiﬁes that information on statistical signiﬁcance is
not available for the reported ﬁgure.
7. Survey data from Van and Diyarbakir provinces showed
secondary school enrolment among beneﬁciaries at 11
and 65%, respectively, though this national dataset is
not considered statistically representative at the provin-
cial level (Adato et al., 2007).
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